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emergence, epiphenomenalism...stuff like that

Philosophers recognize that a new, higher-level property can become present in matter--a property that is not merely the sum of the lower-level properties belonging to matter. Philosophers speak of this new property as emerging from from its material constituents. That is, the many constituents together possess this one emergent property (e.g., a mental state).

I would say, however, that it makes more sense to say that the property is the property of one being.

Otherwise, the property would be a mere effect of the many parts (epiphenomenalism) or the mere summation of the properties of the parts (reductive materialism).

Action follows being. So if there is an action/property that is not reducible to the sum of the lower level actions/properties, then it must be the property of a being that is likewise not reducible.

I would direct the following criticism to those who think of the parts as the real entity. why should the lower-level properties be said to below to lower-level beings? Can't we subject the claims about the lower level beings to the same sort of criticism that we did to the emergent reality? Wouldn't the lower level properties have emerged from even lower level beings? Doesn't this lead to an infinite regress? Or if we don't want to face such a regress, then we must have a more satisfactory basis for saying that something is one being rather than a collection of beings. We must be able to answer the question, "what does "to be" mean? Doesn't the answer come, ultimately, from our life world (in this case from our experience of our own unity as we engage in perception, feeling, action, thought, etc.)?

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