I am trying to remember what I learned from the study of physicalism... it think it is that to each physical state there corresponds only one mental state.
Suppose the above is true but its converse is false. That is, for any mental state, there is a multiplicity of possible physical states: doesn't this claim amount to an application of the Aristotelian understanding of nature? I'm not thinking about how matter receives a new form; rather, I'm thinking of how something keeps its identity during various incidental changes. For example, I remain a human being in virtue of my substantial form while standing, sitting, talking, snoring, blogging, playing piano, etc.
One and the same form must have a suitable proximate matter. But the mere fact that an entity continues to possess the same form does not imply that the proximate matter has remained identical in every way. My proximate matter remains well-suited to the form that makes me human, yet that matter fluctuates in various ways while my form remains the same.
Perhaps something like this occurs with sensation and perception. If that weren't the case then there would be no such thing as the same act of perception, b/c the underlying "proximate matter" of these cognitive acts IS in flux... if you look at a small enough level electrons in shells? repeated neural firings w/ all their concomitant processes?).
Question: does this characterization of of mental states allow for freedom?
Answer: I think, actually, that it helps make freedom possible. For a person can seek a species of good without being determined to relate it to this or that concrete means. In this case the relation of one to many is the the one universal species (of good) and many possible concrete instantiations of that good. The judgment that this concrete instantiation is to be pursued is not a necessary one, I think.
Suppose the above is true but its converse is false. That is, for any mental state, there is a multiplicity of possible physical states: doesn't this claim amount to an application of the Aristotelian understanding of nature? I'm not thinking about how matter receives a new form; rather, I'm thinking of how something keeps its identity during various incidental changes. For example, I remain a human being in virtue of my substantial form while standing, sitting, talking, snoring, blogging, playing piano, etc.
One and the same form must have a suitable proximate matter. But the mere fact that an entity continues to possess the same form does not imply that the proximate matter has remained identical in every way. My proximate matter remains well-suited to the form that makes me human, yet that matter fluctuates in various ways while my form remains the same.
Perhaps something like this occurs with sensation and perception. If that weren't the case then there would be no such thing as the same act of perception, b/c the underlying "proximate matter" of these cognitive acts IS in flux... if you look at a small enough level electrons in shells? repeated neural firings w/ all their concomitant processes?).
Question: does this characterization of of mental states allow for freedom?
Answer: I think, actually, that it helps make freedom possible. For a person can seek a species of good without being determined to relate it to this or that concrete means. In this case the relation of one to many is the the one universal species (of good) and many possible concrete instantiations of that good. The judgment that this concrete instantiation is to be pursued is not a necessary one, I think.
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