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action/ passion and perception

If what we call "perception" is merely our shorthand for a complex chemical reaction, then it would seem at least at first glance that it can only be (generaically speaking) awareness of that which most immediately caused it. Or rather, one who maintains a reductionist position must explain how this special chemical reaction could be about something other than that which most immediately caused it. For other chemical reactions (in plants and non-living things) don't seem to be "about" anything. They are charcterized merely in terms of that with which they are immediately interacting with. So either one must posit some cosmic awareness (ala Dennett) posit an emergent property (which is as magical as the steady state theory) or admit the reductivist thesis is problematic.

Let's expand on that problem: given the restriction of awareness to that which is immediately acting upon the brain, then there could not be two cognitions of the same object. No two people could share the same belief. In which case there would only be one reductionist adhering to one belief. Or perhaps that reductionism would soon melt away in the Heraclitan stream.

What's amazing about perception is that there are cognitions of objects that reach out beyond the molecules that most immediately touch the cognizing part of the brain. Giving an account of this is not a piece of cake for a non-reductionist. But it is at least possible, given the fact that they recognize different types of beings.

Once again, since there are multiple cognitions of the same object, it follows that something is wrong with the reductionist/or perhaps eliminativist position stated at the beginning.

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