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I need to study this passage in Physics more thoroughly:

It's Book 6, chapter 8. It's almost as if Ari's saying that when a thing is moving, it's not right to say that it's here or there... otherwise, one would be saying that this (moving thing) is at rest. Sorta like the scientific discovery that moving things have a certain indeterminacy re their location. I see a parallel...or the mirage of a parallel.

Of course, the latter discovery may be thought to be more epistemic than ontological. That is, one may object to my spotting of a parallel by saying that modern science has shown something about the limits of a scientist's knowledge of motion rather than having gotten an insight into the nature of motion itself. Again, one may object that just because we can't determine exactly where a moving thing is, doesn't mean it doesn't have a definite "where."

Something to look further into.

Comments

Unknown said…
I wouldn't say that quantum indeterminacy means that we are fundamentally uncertain about the location of an object, as though it's a limit to the length of a ruler. The real issue is that before measurement, a particle is a smeared out blob, whereas upon measurement, it collapses into a point, and then starts to smear out again.

This brings me to the issue - the way that quantum mechanics understands measurement seems to be another example of an inherent "arrow of time" in nature - a phenomena, like the 2nd law of thermodynamics, which delineates a definite beginning, middle, and end.
Leo White said…
Re first comment: Really? They should call them weirdicles instead of particles.
Re second: I don't see the arrow of time in the blob-point-blob pattern. But I do see it w/ entropy. But isn't entropy just a global application of the principle that things seek equilibrium (wait: "seek" hmmmn: teleological: voila!).
The amazing thing about observer dependence in quantum theory is that it might be another way in which striving to deanthropomorphize natural science is futile.

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