physicalism, emergent properties, anomalous behavior and how to avoid reductionism & leave room for freedom
Consider the following four postulates:
(As I noted in an earlier post) I affirm with the physicalist that every physical state corresponds to only one mental state, but I deny the converse. In fact, I think this truth is merely an instance of a more general pattern. Every lower order state or set of lower order conditions corresponds to just one higher order state, but not vice versa.
Borrowing something I learned from Plantinga, I deny epiphenomenalism because otherwise evolutionary theory would be absurd. If animal consciousness is adaptive, then it must direct behavior rather than being like the froth on the beer.
Entities, in virtue of their higher order properties, act so as to attain higher order equilibria. These actions are anomolous with respect to lower order properties. And that in two ways.
First, because, given only information about the lower order properties, you couldn't predict how the entity with higher order props would behave, except on the basis of patterns observed in previously encountered higher order entities of the same kind. But I am assuming that you have no such information. Your task--an impossible one I maintain--is to predict behavior SOLELY on the basis of what has been observed at the lower level.
Secondly, because the higher order behavior is in part a function of its interaction with other higher order entities. True, it can do this only through lower order properties (e.g., speaking). But there is a lawfulness in this interactive behavior that can be discerned only by regarding it as a higher order interaction somewhat embodied in the lower (communication), and in such a manner that the lower underdetermines the higher.
In such a case, you have a kind of teleology, for each level has its equilibrium that it acts so as to attain. And if to the degree that that the goal is something of a sufficiently universal nature, then to that degree the entity wouldn't be determined by specific differences. And to the degree that the entity strives to interact with other entities at a higher order, to that degree it is not determined (underdetermined) by lower order differences. And if there is an entity that strives toward an interaction with the universal good (whatever that means), it will not be determined to seek any specific good. And if this same entity also seeks the highest good, then it will not be detemined to seek any lower good, except inasmuch as it refers to the highest....
Oh well, this is just a rough sketch... more polishing needed.
1. The affirmation of physicalism (if by this term we mean the thesis that every physical state corresponds to only one mental state), and
2. The denial of the converse of postulate 1 (i.e., the denial that every mental state corresponds to only one physical state) (to put this in other words, the same mental state can be instantiated by more than one physical state).
3. The affirmation of the claim that the relation between truths 1/2 vis-a-vis mental physical states is but an instance of a patter occurring in all cases between a lower order property and a higher one.
4. The affirmation of the claim that emergent properties can be sources of action rather than merely epiphenomenal (something discussed in an earlier post)
If we grant the above four posulates, then there is room for freedom in human beings.
Below: an elaboration on a couple of the postulates made above:
(As I noted in an earlier post) I affirm with the physicalist that every physical state corresponds to only one mental state, but I deny the converse. In fact, I think this truth is merely an instance of a more general pattern. Every lower order state or set of lower order conditions corresponds to just one higher order state, but not vice versa.
Borrowing something I learned from Plantinga, I deny epiphenomenalism because otherwise evolutionary theory would be absurd. If animal consciousness is adaptive, then it must direct behavior rather than being like the froth on the beer.
Entities, in virtue of their higher order properties, act so as to attain higher order equilibria. These actions are anomolous with respect to lower order properties. And that in two ways.
First, because, given only information about the lower order properties, you couldn't predict how the entity with higher order props would behave, except on the basis of patterns observed in previously encountered higher order entities of the same kind. But I am assuming that you have no such information. Your task--an impossible one I maintain--is to predict behavior SOLELY on the basis of what has been observed at the lower level.
Secondly, because the higher order behavior is in part a function of its interaction with other higher order entities. True, it can do this only through lower order properties (e.g., speaking). But there is a lawfulness in this interactive behavior that can be discerned only by regarding it as a higher order interaction somewhat embodied in the lower (communication), and in such a manner that the lower underdetermines the higher.
In such a case, you have a kind of teleology, for each level has its equilibrium that it acts so as to attain. And if to the degree that that the goal is something of a sufficiently universal nature, then to that degree the entity wouldn't be determined by specific differences. And to the degree that the entity strives to interact with other entities at a higher order, to that degree it is not determined (underdetermined) by lower order differences. And if there is an entity that strives toward an interaction with the universal good (whatever that means), it will not be determined to seek any specific good. And if this same entity also seeks the highest good, then it will not be detemined to seek any lower good, except inasmuch as it refers to the highest....
Oh well, this is just a rough sketch... more polishing needed.
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