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Dawkins, bacteria, citrate, and irreducible complexity

In The Greatest Show on Earth, Dawkins describes a decades long experiment in which, after 33,000 generations of bacteria, one of twelve flasks developed the ability to ingest citrate. This required two mutations. The (the A mutation, he calls it) first happened in the 20,000th generation, providing no benefit. But 13K generations later, a second, B mutation made possible something quite radically new. All of the other adaptations were linear, but this one jumped off the charts.

He cites this as a result that disproves the impossibility of the arising of structures that have irreducible complexity. Worthy point, but I can't help but wonder whether it actually supports the argument made by Behe, for he argues not that it is impossible, but that it is improbable. The worthwhile question is: what about those other eleven flasks: did they also eventually undergo both the A and B mutations? After 40k generations? 60K? 80K? 120K? 2M? In other words, given the long terms results of this experiment, how improbable is the conjunction of mutations A and B?

Comments

Leo White said…
The "worthy question" that I mention at the end actually misses the point, which is as follows: the fact that tens of thousands of generations had to occur before one useful mutation arising is a bit of an embarrassment to Dawkins' attempted rebuttal (I say this while insisting that ID is not helpful to nor is required for theism).

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