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Just listened to a debate between Atkins and McGrath

Amazing how Atkins talks dismissively to McGrath about the latter's belief in God as wish fulfillment, and then makes a colossal faith-like act in the ability of science to know all that is. Amazing too how Atkins denies that the universe has a meaning or purpose, and then displays at every point in the discussion, a craving for unbounded knowledge of what is. That atheist is so purpose driven.

Then again, Atkins also distinguishes between cosmic purpose (which he denies) and individual desires (which I think he would not deny having), such as the desire to know. But acknowledging the desire to know...(thanking Giussani for help in phrasing this)... reality in all of its factors is not really different from admitting that one has a purpose in life. A purpose that one has not chosen, and in that sense, a natural purpose.

Humans see human purposes from the inside. We can suppose that only humans have natural goals, in which case on is engaging in exceptionalism--an ironic position for a materialist! But if other organisms strive to live and act, why not call them natural purposes as well. In other words, once we de- instrumentalize purpose, that is, stop looking at it as an imposition by divine fiat, once we stop looking at it that way, it starts to look much more plausible. One may not see ONE central purpose of the universe as a whole, but the same universe is chock full of purpose (at least in cognitive organisms).

[digression for another post: how one can uncover purpose of the whole-as-such as the condition for the possibility of individuals as such having individual purposes within themselves]

Let me approach the same theme differently.

If religious claims about what has not yet been both experienced and reported can be dismissed as mere wish fulfillment, then can the same be said to Atkins' claim that science can give us definitive knowledge about everything? Mere wish fulfillment?

On the other hand, even if such a criticism can be made against fundamentalist positivism,then there is nevertheless something good to be said about the positivist's desire for knowledge. It involves the recognition that humans cannot live fulfilled lives without at least seeking the truth. And those who criticize belief in eternal life would do well to acknowledge the good desires that give impetus to belief in eternal life.

Also, truth is at least integral to the purpose of life for humans. Otherwise, why compare science and religion according to this standard?
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