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a better way of understanding freedom, er, I think..

Plato talked about ideas in a way that gives the impression that he believes there is a kind of immaterial realm, a set of beings called ideas.  I don't see the need to make that move, although I do think that we are moved, ultimately by the desire for God.  But I do acknowledge that we are motivated by objects of sorts that are not to be located in a particular place or time.  They have a kind of ideality about them, even though they are "of this world" rather than "other worldly."

Consider the following example  We don't desire simply to taste this yummy food here and now, but to taste yummy food in general.  The latter desire motivates us to experiment with new recipes... not the latter.  But there is a kind of ideality in the latter when compared to the former.

"I taste this food here and now": finite verb, i.e., with a definite time and place indicates an event.

"To taste good food": Infinitive "indicates" a non-event.


We are moved to engage in the world because we are attracted to these infinitives.  Freedom begins with  letting oneself be drawn by these "infinitives"

When we talk of God as infinite, we do so because we see our own striving as unlimited yet hope that it be satisfied by a kind of activity, a kind of union that is not entirely unlike the consummation of a marriage.  A believer sees himself as attracted to the infinite in all of these infinitives.  If that is so, then Freedom is an event where the infinite breaks into the finite.

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