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I am NOT an advocate of ID, but this criticism by Shermer is lame

Michael Shermer argues that ID stifles creativity.  I can see why one would think this claim plausible: it is easy to imagine that one who believes in ID thinks that acceptance of that hypothesis amounts to saying "God did it miraculously" whenever one encounters a phenomenon that's too difficult to expalin via natural causes.  But once we know that God did it, there seems to be no need to ask how God effected this mystery: the only answer that can be given is that it was done miraculously.  And why did God perform this miracle?  Because God chose to do so.   Why does God choose to act one way rather than another?  One cannot explain this completely, because if one could give a complete explanation of God's actions, then it would the case that those actions happened necessarily.  In which case they would not be free. 

This appeal to divine will is a bit of a conversation stopper--if the conversation is one about scientific explanation.  Hence Shermer opposes ID so that the scientific conversation--and the creativity that takes place therein--may flourish.

BUT Shermer also mentions an experiment that supposedly shows that ID need to rejected.  Well, if IF generates such research then it is not a source of complacency in the scientific community at large.  In fact, it may generate a lack of complacency.  For if it poses challenges worthy of consideration (IF!), then those who accept these challenges will have to come up with demonstrations to prove what they previously more or less took for granted.  The key word in this paragraph is, of course, 'if'!

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