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Shermer attempts to defeat theism by appeal to extra terrestrials

Shermer brings up ETI (extra terrestrial intelligence) as a defeater to theism.  That is, any purported evidence of God, says Shermer, can also be explained by positing extra terrestrials or ETIs.

Such an argument actually makes theism look more rational than atheism.  For two reasons.

First because in order to avoid a theistic explanation of miracles (including those that might be posited by ID theory), one may have to posit fantastic creatures for which we have no particular evidence.  Granted, an ETI would be sufficient to account for the phenomena in question.  But since there is no evidence of an ETI, isn't this more like an ad hoc appeal to hidden magic when the hypothesis of God would be simpler?  And it would leave science MORE intact than appeal to ETIs.  For one could just as easily suppose that there are water nymphs, etc. as one could suppose that there are ETIs.  In other words, science could break down once we invent finite agencies that intervene in the world to explain its unexpected features.  One who posits the one infinite and unchanging God. on the other hand, posits a being that is not part of nature but is the source of nature's existence.  Theism allows nature to be lawful rather than whimsical (think ET, the movie or Q, the character in Star Trek.
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