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Newman's Development of Doctrine and acorns

It might be helpful to compare how the full blown Catholic understanding, say, of Mary developed out of the Scriptural and early Christian understanding of Mary with the way an oak tree develops from an acorn.  In each case, the before and after look different but are essentially the same.  And one naturally leads to the other just as promise leads naturally (on a good day) to fulfillment.

Comments

Tim D said…
I like that. There's also the line of argument that it's practiced to some degree in the Old Testament - Jeremiah fights from heaven in 2 Maccabees (though that book will not be recognized by an Evangelical), as well as Revelation 5:8 - and some traditions in Judaism of Elijah communicating to the present world.
Leo White said…
Thanks for your comment; but could you give me more details?
Tim D said…
The Maccabees example shows Jeremiah interceding from heaven to help them win against the Macedonians. Even if one doesn't think it's scripture, it's evidence that the practice of the intercession of saints pre-dated Christianity. Revelation 5:8 talks about the heavenly elders bringing bowls of incense to the altar, "which are the prayers of the saints". An in Judaism today there is the occasional example of Elijah communicating from heaven, which also suggests the ancient origin of the intercession of the saints.
Leo White said…
Got it. Well, my point in the original post is to look for a Catholic doctrine that at first glance seems to have a less than sufficient basis in ancient beliefs, and then to look for ways in which the presently held faith has grown out of the past--in a manner analogous to oak/acorn. That is, the oak and acorn are very different in shape. One who knows the oak only from afar and has never seen it drop from the acorn wouldn't think of the two as related. But one who not only knows the story up close but also has looked into the dna of the acorn and oak, can explain how the oak is a natural development from the acorn. The combination of "natural development" and "different in (superficial) form" is my target.

So the Old Eve / New Eve contrast alluded to, I think by Iraneaus (or was it Ignatius -- I get those two guys mixed up) is a kind of acorn from which the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception developed.

As for intercession of the saints, that is very, very helpful inasmuch as it undercuts the possible claim that the Catholic focus on the saints is an adaptation of the Roman Pantheon. But if ancient Jews understood Elijah as you say, then the doctrine of intercession was already "oakie" to begin with (I probably should avoid such wordplay when in Oklahoma).

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