Skip to main content

straight line, ellipse, telos, momentum, fiction

When we hear of the law of momentum, we think of movement in a straight line.  But perhaps the same movement could be thought of as an extremely small section of elliptical movement.  For if you were to set two very small and dense rocks in movement in relation to each other with nothing else around, one or both would move in an elliptical orbit with respect to the other rather than in a straight line.

But in any case, imagine a projectile rock moving toward three rocks that form a perfect triangle and are stationary with respect to each other.  It's heading toward the middle of the triangle and at a right angle to the plain defined by the three non-projectile rocks.  Since there are three rather than one, the path of the projectile rock will be the average of the three elliptical paths that it would have travelled around each of the other three.  The resultant path would look a lot more like a straight line.

Perhaps the straight line movement that we imagine when we hear of the law of momentum is really the result of averaging of all of the would-be elliptical paths that the projectile would travel if it were relating to any one part of the physical surroundings.    


Doesn't the straight-line-as-average capture the interrelatedness of movement better?  Isn't the law of momentum, as typically understood, more of a useful fiction than a genuine understanding of what is going on in nature?  Finally, isn't there something teleological about elliptical movement?  After all, in the Summa contra gentiles Aquinas -- following Aristotle and others -- spoke of circular movement as teleological.  Isn't the ellpsis just a Keplerian correction of the circle?  So: if the straight line mentioned in the law of momentum is in some sense derived from many elliptical movements, then isn't that straight line in some derivative sense teleological as well?

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

P F Strawson's Freedom and Resentment: the argument laid out

Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson.  He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal.  My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this.  I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true.  Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist.  In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...

response to friend who suggested that the self is a democracy of neural parts

This is a nice way to try to avoid being cornered re the irreality of the self if you're a reductionist, for you can assert that a pattern obtains at the microscopic level that is not all that unlike the pattern found at the societal level.  No need for the one self that does it all: instead, you have many sub-selfs that compete for dominance or take turns guiding the whole. The problem with this is, however, that the voters/officials are all zombies.  None of them thinks about the whole as such.  And perhaps none of them thinks even about themselves (unless one is a panzoist).  None of them makes a comparison of alternatives. The more this proposed democracy seems like a zombocracy, the more consciousness will be seem to be epiphenomenal. Furthermore, if the oneness of the self is less real than the multiplicity of explanatory neural parts, then why can't each of these neural parts be conceived of as democracy as well?  And why not parts of these parts, et...

interesting article by Jimmy Akin on death before the Fall

http://www.ncregister.com/blog/jimmy-akin/did-animals-die-before-the-fall/ Akin below: Aquinas.... writes: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals  [ Summa Theologiae I:96:1 ad 2 ].  Aquinas thus holds that it was not  all  death that entered the world through man's sin, but human  death.