The Human Question

What if the cosmological arguments are falsifiable inasmuch as they are based upon our common sense intuitions about human agency, which -- in the opinion of materialists, at least -- are indeed falsifiable (i.e., if we don't have freedom of the will, indefeasible knowledge, etc.).  What if our common sense intuitions about agency suffice to provide the basis for demonstrating the existence of God?  That is, what if we are in a sense presupposing the existence of God simply by engaging in the world? Then both the Popperians and the presuppositionalists will have something to cheer about.

Sam Harris says that all religions are exclusivist.  In Judaism, however, we see something different even at the very beginning.  The very first time that God communicates with Abraham, he reveals that the patriarch will be a source of blessings to the nations.  There is a sense of God choosing Abraham apart from the others.  But this election is, from the beginning, promised to be a source of blessings to others.  Hardly exclusivist.

Sam Harris argues that religion is fundamentally fundamentalist, and that any person who seems to have reconciled religion with modernity is actually ignorant of what his or her religion entails--something that can be know only when scripture is interpreted literally.  Professor Tyler Roberts points out in his rebuttal that fundamentalism is actually a modern thing, in which some religious persons copy the modern quest for a clear and distinct source of foundation, be that foundation the written word of God or pronouncements by the hierarchy. I would also point out that Harris himself might not be following his own advice.  If he were to follow atheism to its logical conclusion, then his materialism would cause him to reject freedom of the will, human rights, the ability of the mind to know mathematical and scientific truths, etc.  I don't know Harris's position on freedom, but if a scientific outlook on the world holds no room for religion, then materialism would be true, in

Daniel Dennett calls for the naturalistic study of religion.  I'm all for it, if by "natural" you mean the natural capacity of human beings to look for the infinite.  I propose that -- before you do a naturalistic analysis of religion -- you do that sort of analysis of mathematics.  In particular, give an account of how, when you know a number or equation, you can know that someone else at a different place and time cab be aware of the same number/equation/and of its unchanging truth.  Once you've given an adequate account of this, you might be ready to ponder religion's quest for a being most perfect and all knowing.

Every invention is a sign of human freedom.

Assignment of probability/improbability of an event presupposes knowledge of some of the necessary conditions.  When it comes to miracles, one of those conditions--the one that is both necessary and sufficient--is whether or not God has decided to perform a miracle.  It doesn't seem that one can assign probability/improbability to this sort of "event"...

If guilt is, as Nietzsche seems to suggest, an invention of the priests of Israel, then nothing prior to the priesthood should bear much resemblance to guilt.  But if there's something like it in subhuman animals, then N's claim seems just plain fanciful.  And if it has an analogue in the animal kingdom that a materialist would naturally imagine serves as the foundation for human guilt feelings, well, then N's commitment to naturalism is at odds with his genealogy of morals.

Maybe the part of the outline of my book (the part that is anti-mechanistic) could be used later on to argue for God.  But how?  It would seem to argue more obviously for something like a world soul...Gotta look into this when I get the chance...

Nietzsche says that the priestly class invented good and evil in order to subvert society.  They wanted the nobles' power, but were too weak to overthrow them, so they outwitted them instead, convincing them that their quest for power was evil and inculcating them with a love of freedom, equality, and justice.  Such virtues and ideas made the nobles unwitting, de facto subjects of the priests. It is worth noting, however, that Nietzsche also recognizes that the priests' influence didn't start with the invention of good and evil.  Prior to then, says N, the priests were responsible for leading ancestor worship.  Thus it seems that it was only because the priests were already influential in the community that they could change the minds of the nobles as they did with the invention of good and evil. Contrast Nietzsche's account with the Old Testament story of Melchizedek, the first priestly figure described in the Bible (unless Able is a priestly figure):  M is not on

In the last couple of centuries there have been many different materialists with different moralities: Herbert Spenser, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche to name a few.  They didn't merely reject the supernatural while otherwise accepting the values of their culture: they changed the moral landscape in a way that cohered somewhat with their materialistic vision.  They differed, however, in the ways in which they changed the moral landscape. This difference spawns a problem for one who who embraces materialism today.   He must ask his or her self how and whether this doctrine affects his view of human existence.  If he believes, for example, that humans are at some level equal in dignity, then he must ask why he thinks so when other materialists have not.  Suppose that he wanted to persuade a fellow materialist with whom he disagreed about morality:  would he argue on the basis of scientific evidence?  If so, how would that argument fare against a counterargument likewise based u

I once read that Aquinas says that the closest thing to divine charity that one will find in the natural order is love for the common good of society.  I just looked for that quote, however, and couldn't find it.  But let's assume that my memory is accurate.  If it is, then it would not be difficult to argue that justice and the common good in some sense point to God. But put that thought on hold for a second and turn now to Marx, who looks at these concepts quite differently.  He thinks that talk of justice and equality as an alienating dualism just as much as theism.  In a similar spirit Nietzsche also says that focusing on freedom, responsibility and justice, good and evil are all -- like theism -- nihilistic, because they are metaphysical and hence otherworldly. [later addition: I need to put Freud here, because his three part analysis of the human subject does not allow for a per se desire for the common good: there is a self-interested id and a demanding super-ego, bu