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Melchisedech and Nietzsche

Nietzsche says that the priestly class invented good and evil in order to subvert society.  They wanted the nobles' power, but were too weak to overthrow them, so they outwitted them instead, convincing them that their quest for power was evil and inculcating them with a love of freedom, equality, and justice.  Such virtues and ideas made the nobles unwitting, de facto subjects of the priests.

It is worth noting, however, that Nietzsche also recognizes that the priests' influence didn't start with the invention of good and evil.  Prior to then, says N, the priests were responsible for leading ancestor worship.  Thus it seems that it was only because the priests were already influential in the community that they could change the minds of the nobles as they did with the invention of good and evil.

Contrast Nietzsche's account with the Old Testament story of Melchizedek, the first priestly figure described in the Bible (unless Able is a priestly figure):  M is not only a priest but the king (of Salem) as well.  He uses bread and wine to offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving in Abraham's name.  In the Old Testament version of this history, the need to give thanks and enter into a kind of communion with God comes before the Levitical priesthood's concern with expiating sin.

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