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whose materialism? which atheism?

In the last couple of centuries there have been many different materialists with different moralities: Herbert Spenser, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche to name a few.  They didn't merely reject the supernatural while otherwise accepting the values of their culture: they changed the moral landscape in a way that cohered somewhat with their materialistic vision.  They differed, however, in the ways in which they changed the moral landscape.

This difference spawns a problem for one who who embraces materialism today.   He must ask his or her self how and whether this doctrine affects his view of human existence.  If he believes, for example, that humans are at some level equal in dignity, then he must ask why he thinks so when other materialists have not.  Suppose that he wanted to persuade a fellow materialist with whom he disagreed about morality:  would he argue on the basis of scientific evidence?  If so, how would that argument fare against a counterargument likewise based upon scientific data.

Consider the racism so apparent in Darwin's Descent of Man.  He takes it as obvious even that the Irish race is inferior to the Scots, and he all but approves of eugenics.  Consider how Herbert Spenser (for whom Darwin expressed his admiration) disapproves of the state's use of resources to help the poor and handicapped.  To what principles might a committed materialist appeal in arguing against these fellow materialist?

Might those principles also be used by someone else (namely moi) to support theism?

I propose that they would: as soon as an atheist tries to build up an adequate account of morality, he starts supplying claims that serve as premises supporting the conclusion that there is a transcendent  and provident Supreme Being.

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