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G. E. Moore, absolute isolation, value

G. E. Moore asked us to do a thought experiment in order to determine whether things have an absolute value apart from their being perceived.  We are asked to imagine that we are a god who can choose between creating two worlds, one in which beauty can be found even though no perceivers inhabit it (e.g., a world with the Grand Canyon or its like), and another in which beauty is entirely lacking (e.g., New Jersey).  GEM believes a reasonable being would prefer to create the beautiful world --even though no one will ever perceive it, and he takes this as evidence that some things have value even apart from our valuing them. (This based on Professor Grimm's lecture #13 from A Question of Value)

But isn't the point of this thought experiment rather the fact that we value the very existence of some things apart from our perceiving them?  Maybe I'm not really disagreeing with Moore here.  But his thought experiment seems to point to a contemplative dimension in human nature, and to indicate that this dimension is god-like, and in that way analogous to God's creative love for the world (q.v., "...and He saw that it was good") and especially for the world's rational inhabitants.

Another thought: GEM's thought experiment can help us understand Aquinas's claim that God loves us (and all creatures) in loving Himself.  For while in the aforementioned demigod position, we actually do behold the world in the sense that we have it in mind.  And inasmuch as it exists, it exists for us inasmuch as we delight in the very fact that it is.  It is because we love ourselves that we love to "behold" this world, and it is because of the latter that we will that it exist.

Something analogous is the case with God.

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