While listening to what Wittgenstein has to say about necessity as it pertains to mathematics, I noted that he is not denying that we encounter constraint or necessity when doing mathematics: he is denying that this constraint comes from something outside the game. Rather, it is from the game itself. But what if mathematics is a game we can play with rational beings very different from ourselves? Can we intuit that all would be constrained as we are? Even if they are incredibly smarter? And what about God? Is math a game we play with God rather than being a kind of activity the we aim at God (or at God's Mind) as a kind of ideal object?
This is a nice way to try to avoid being cornered re the irreality of the self if you're a reductionist, for you can assert that a pattern obtains at the microscopic level that is not all that unlike the pattern found at the societal level. No need for the one self that does it all: instead, you have many sub-selfs that compete for dominance or take turns guiding the whole. The problem with this is, however, that the voters/officials are all zombies. None of them thinks about the whole as such. And perhaps none of them thinks even about themselves (unless one is a panzoist). None of them makes a comparison of alternatives. The more this proposed democracy seems like a zombocracy, the more consciousness will be seem to be epiphenomenal. Furthermore, if the oneness of the self is less real than the multiplicity of explanatory neural parts, then why can't each of these neural parts be conceived of as democracy as well? And why not parts of these parts, et...
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