The Human Question

Relativity makes it impossible to say two events are simultaneous except with respect to an observer's position. Two observers looking upon the same set of events from very different perspective will disagree about whether or not they simultaneous. But doesn't this lead to an absurd scenario: isn't it impossible for me to say that I exist since the co-existence of my body parts is only apparent. In other words, the problem mentioned in the previous paragraph seems to be true even within an individual, except on a smaller scale.

Around p. 71, Pinker illustrates what he means by "good reductionism" by applying Chomsky's division of the analysis of mind into five mutually irreducible levels(: "good reductionism")to language. The first four levels treat language as an "intervnal, individual entity." The fifth, however, is "external language," i.e., language as it exists in a culture. Such a treatment of language has its problems. For language is never simply internal. Nor is culture simply external. Pinker would perhaps agree and add that it involves an interaction of the two and that culture studies one side of that interaction, the other four disciplines study the other side. But my point is that language can never be grasped as an interaction of inner and outer events. It consists of individuals sharing something in common: the sharing is personal, that which is shared is common. But the sharing is not an internal event observed in the same manner that the ac...

There is an important equality among human beings only if there is a real heirarchy of being within the cosmos.

He has an ingenious (ly wrong) take on folks with divided cc's: must review and comment upon. Also, it would be fun rhetorically to compare is own lack of awareness of internal inconsistency with the examples given by him of how a person with a disconnected corpus callosum talks in a manner that suggests that he has a "divided mind" about the issues.

Pinker contrasts "greedy" reductionism, which he rejects, with "good" reductionism , which he advocates (note the moralizing grade-school teacher language). Good reductionism as he sees it is the sort that admits of different explanatory levels. Citing Hilary Putnam, he says that you can't explain why a round peg doesn't fit in a square hole by talking about what happens at the quantum level. The whole may be the sum of its parts, but we can grasp the one explanation of why the square peg doesn't fit into the round whole only by thematizing the whole (in this case, the peg and the hole) as such. Digression: actually, a more adequate explanation must also talk about how forces at a micro level are responsible for the resistance we feel when pressing the non fitting parts together. An adequate explanation must include BOTH how the parts as such tend to interact and the configuration of the whole made of these non-matching parts (the square/round shape...

I would direct these toward one who thinks of evolution as leading away from theism. Isn't evolution beautiful? Isn't beauty good? and Isn't the source of that goodness likewise good?

Aristotle's insistence on the role of spheres in his cosmology AND the modern recognition of the fundamental role of symmetry (as discussed by Stephen Barr).

After having taken a couple of months break so that I could learn to speak French, I'm back to blogging. Not much to say, but with a new semester (and a course on the philosophy of nature) looming, I very disposed to think of these things. My present interest is in learning some more neurology, chaos theory, linguistics. Will try to give some input on those topics as I begin to look at them again (and at chaos for the first time).

Both of them are basically equally well-versed in science, although they may disagree about the sort of controversies that competent scientists may disagree over. One of them is firmly convinced that all humans are equal in the sense in which a modern member of a democratic society understands "equal." The other denies this claim and affirms instead a kind of Nietzschean view of human nature. What is the basis for the difference in their convictions about human nature? Whatever it is, it is not a scientific basis.

Only humans desire luxury, relish, i.e., the sensory good as good.

The above description by Aquinas of the object of the highest perceptive power offers plenty of possible comparisons with Alva Noe's theory of perception as being inherently actional. Also, the action/passion talk can be understood in the following way. When I perceive a menacing dog and feel fear, I don't piece together the behavior/feelings of the dog on one hand and of myself on the other. Rather I perceive the threateningme/mybeingthreatened in one act, an act that at the same time relates to appetite in a similar manner. More later.

In his CUA lecture in honor of Fr. Sokolowski, Richard Cobb-Stevens notes how Soko completes Husserl's account of idealization in geometry by pointing out how in geometry, we measure the sides of a figure against itself. That is, instead of taking a ruler as a unit of measure, we measure the different sides of the figure against each other, using one as a unit of measure. This sort of bending of a whole upon itself can be done in geometry but not with real figures. This kinda reminds me of how, when we think of our own happiness or fulfillment, we think about ourselves in a manner (only very loosely) analogous to the above example of geometry. There is a kind of bending of a whole upon itself. Ditto with our awareness of ourselves as bearers and conveyers of truth. It occurs to me, furthermore, that Aquinas's talk of a reflexio involved in judgment is not of some purely spiritual part of us that, because of its angel-like simplicity, its lack of parts, is able to reflect up...

Our bodily movement is expressive because it is not tied concerned only about the here and now.

The less relevant a claim is to our immediate survival, the more reliably true it can be. That 2+3=5 always and everywhere is never relevant to our immediate survival; whereas that these (two) plus those (three) equal five may well be relevant on occasion, yet the former is more reliably true than the latter.

In his Briefer history of time, he states the two following errors: 1. That up until the time of Columbus it was commonly believed that the earth was flat. Well, if by commonly he means other than the educated class, well, maybe so. But even in the 13th century Thomas Aquinas begins the Summa theologiae by mentioning in an offhand way that we know the earth is round thanks to principles of geometry. 2. That it was Church doctrine for centuries that the earth is the center of the universe. Uh, I know of no such doctrine.

I just learned that in my previous posts I got physicalism/supervenience wrong. Correct understanding: supervenience is the claim that a cognitive act is realizable in different instances, and in different kinds of matter. Physicalism is the denial that there is anything other than a materially realized version of consciousness.

Noe points out that the question, "How do you know that you aren't a brain in a vat?" has been used in order to undercut our tendency to take for granted that we have an immediate experience of and interaction with our environment. The expected answer, "I don't know," is supposed to lead us to conclude that our brain is directly aware only of internally produced representations while our body is a kind of vat that houses, nourishes, stimulates and responds to the brain. For if it could be a brain in a vat, then one two different stimuli may cause the same cognitive act; in which case it would follow that this cognitive act is not intrinsically ordered toward either of the possible causes. The most appropriate reply would be to show how representationalism runs into problems, regardless of any concern about brains, vats, and the like. But apart from those types of replies I might also argue that merely not knowing with 2+2=4 certainty that one's everyd...

He compares the meaning of words to the value of currency. Words that fall out of use can no longer be used meaningfully in conversation just like coins belonging to a currency no longer in use. This comparison underscores a point that he credits to Putnam: that we are able to use language meaningfully in part because we belong to a community of language users, including those who, perhaps unlike us, know how to apply the terms correctly. For example, says Noe, he can speak meaningfully about the difference between two kinds of trees (elms vs. oaks) even though he himself cannot distinguish one from the other.

A question for those who regard the operation of the brain as computer-like, as calculative: When I throw a ball in the air, it travels in a parabolic path: am I to say that the ball and earth combine to calculate a parabola? If the answer is "no," because this is just a natural process that happens to form a parabola, then why assume that neural processes are anything more than a more complicated version of the same? If the answer is "yes," then isn't every process a calculation, so that there is nothing special about calculation characterizing neuronal activity, and either everything is conscious in some manner OR simply being a calculation does not suffice to characterize a process as cognitive.

"We bark at our children" to get them to school on time.