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anomalous monism

This thesis by Donald Davidson states that mental events are .... surprise!.... anomalous. They are such b/c they can't be accounted for in terms of the laws of nature that apply to non-living things. They are something more than non-mental events, even though they are purely physical.

If we take this as a description of perception (and set aside questions about the human soul, with its knowledge of universal truths), then Davidson seems to be onto something. And the "monism" here might be taken as "non-dualism," i.e., as not precluding an Aristotelian hylomorphism.

Comments

Unknown said…
What does the last word mean?
5:20 PM
Unknown said…
Also, Walker Percy in his philosophical essays says the same thing about language.
5:25 PM
Leo White said…
Hi Tim,
Good to know that at lest one other human being finds my meanderings worth looking into. Now to your question: hylomorphism is two Greek words patched together. 'Hyle' means matter or stuff, as in the stuff out of which something is made. 'Morphe' means form as in shape. A common Thomistic expression (and Thomists are pretty much Aristotelians) is that soul is the form of the body. In other words, body and soul aren't two interactive entities. Rather, they are two principals of one entity. One "informs" the other. An analogy: just as a visible object always has one form or another, so too matter never exists apart from form. This analogy breaks down a bit because the shape of a thing seems to be less real than that which has the shape, whereas the soul is not less real than the body. I am interested not so much in the matter/form relation as it pertains to the body/soul as I am in the matter/form relation as it pertains to sensation, perception. These cognitive operations says Aquinas, have material and formal aspects. By cognitive operations I don't mean anything spiritual, immaterial, immortal or whatever. What I'm talking about pertains to awareness found in dogs and cats as well as humans. And I don't think dogs or cats have immortal souls.
9:03 AM
Leo White said…
Walker Percy speaks of hylomorphism?
9:03 AM
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