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Lorenz's water wheel and Aristotle's mixed bodies and transistors

Warning: This may be waaaaaaaaaaaaaaay off base.

I see an analogy between the behavior of Lorenz's water-wheel and mixed bodies as understood by Aristotelians. The latter are able to act in new ways when the elements are balanced. This balance gives new forms of responsiveness to the environment, and this newness is not predetermined by the properties of the elements alone, nor by a mechanical combination thereof (think of sense organs as examples). Compare with Lorenz's water-wheel, which under some circumstances seems to act chaotically. BUT What seems like CHAOS when interpreted in terms of the lower level laws is itself an orderly response to some part of the environment. The water-wheel may be analogous to a transistor. But that is not to argue reductively, but only to point out the material substrate of higher level activities. Higher level acts are such because they unite, in ONE act, the many diverse lower level acts.

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later criticism: the above confuses, I think, chaos and randomness.  Chaos is non-random.  But maybe chaos is lawful in a way that cannot be articulated at a certain "level" and hence seems random at that level, even though lawful at a higher level.

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