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Moral atheism? The oppositions to narrative theism and to natural theology

Why does one call oneself an atheist?

One reason might be because one is opposed to the narrative of theism (OT stories, Inquisition)?  In as much as one could reject theism on this basis alone then one is a reactionary, inasmuch as one is opposing the theism of the Abrahamic faiths.

Or is one an atheist for principled, philosophical reasons (problem of evil; the alleged incoherence of the very notion of a transcedent personal being)  In such a case, one would also have to be a materialist.  But such an anti-metaphysics makes no room for a notion of the common good that would be adhered to by any virtuous person.  But atheists need not see this logical implication.  And inasmuch as they do not see it, they are inasmuch as they have virtuous convictions, inconsistent with their materialist convictions.  But inasmuch as they are consistently materialist (and I means consistent), they are either manifestly wicked OR the basis of their morality looks more like that of Thomas Hobbes (which leaves no room for nobility of spirit).  But we humans are not consistent.

By the way, while I grant that atheists may have some commendable moral convictions I would argue that what is commendable in these convictions is inconsistent with their atheism

So there are three ways of being atheistic: reactionary, selfish and inconsistent.
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