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idea for a book

It's a book that would be written for my children as college students.

It would principally address issues that I'm good at talking about: science/God; but it would make some reference to Catholic/Evangelical differences, but not in a way that would shift focus away from my initial goal, which is to address theism/atheism controversy.

It would also address in a very general way, the principles that should guide discussions of ethics.  In fact, it would take concerns and presumptions that go into discussions about ethics as fuel for the discussion of the metaphysical themes.  That is, it would relate ethical questions to materialism/theism/dualism

It would point to liturgy as the profoundest human achievement

It would look to Sokoloski as a model of clarity; to RD as a model of exuberance, sense of beauty and humor (but w/o schoolyard bullying); to St. Terese as a model of personal testimony of confidence in God; and Giussani as a model of Christ-centered holism and faith as adventure.

Its tone would be like that of my emails: try to avoid being pompous, funny in an off-the-cuff manner, hopeful, appreciative of beauty, charitable interpretation of opponents and seek their strongest arguments and present them fairly; ready to make distinctions and to employ self-referential arguments to undermine unwitting dogmatism; avoid tribalism; and it would finish with an exhortation.

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