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Dinesh D'Souza v. Bart Ehrman on the problem of evil

D'Souza and Ehrman both make excellent points and give good rebuttals.  And I certainly found fault with Ehrman's brilliant but post-evangelical approach to philosophical questions.  But for the moment I'll point out how D'Souza could have done better.

When Ehrman asked "where is God when there is suffering without relief?" one of the answers that should have been given is that God is present in creation even in those situations.  Otherwise, the impression is given that God is present only when performing miracles.  Given such an assumption, the choice for a theists would be between something like deism (inasmuch as God would often seem to be non-provident) and hyper-supernaturalism (God's always doing miracles... which does not seem to be obviously true).

Another point that D'Souza makes (and is a good one) is skillfully turned in a different direction by Ehrman.  D'Souza argues that human evil outstrips Darwinian necessity.  Good point, provided one interprets it in a somewhat sympathetic manner.  Ehrman replies that he's not sure of which point human evil would have to be so great that it would force one to affirm the existence of God.  Brilliant comeback, but obviously a red herring to one who sees the real value of D'Souza's question.

Here is how I would steer this discussion back on track.  Human evil outstrips materialism inasmuch as it requires the ability to think abstractly and in a sense to desire infinitely.  When we will evil, it is because we will a finite good in a sense infinitely, which is a kind of disorder, idolatry.

This abstract, infinitizing character of evil will problematicizes materialism and with it atheism.  It doesn't so much demonstrate the existence of God as it undermines atheism (sort of like knocking down one of the premises of your opponent's argument rather than proving true the contradictory of that proposition).

***
Back to the debate.  Again, D'Souza makes some excellent points, one of which is delightful (when Ehrman objects that "you're intellectualizing suffering" D'Souza replies, "That's why we're having a debate."), but still I'm going to point out where DD could have done better... perhaps he would have done much better had he, as I've had, the luxury of listening to the debate two or three times.

DD proposes (in the form of a question) that the Christian understanding of life after death is more consoling, telling the believer that they will be united with their loved one some day.  Bart Ehrman replies that this proposal is actually cruel, because it amounts to saying, [and I paraphrase] "You should be happy because you'll get to see them again."; better to sit shiva with the mourning, like Job's friends did with him.

BE is onto something, even though he goes out of his way to characterize DD's proposal as "offensive." But I would point out that the correct Christian message is that you are together with the loved one in spirit: there is reason to be happy about this, but that reason coexists with the understandable feeling of loss from the absence of that loved one from your daily life.  In other words, an emphasis on the communion of saints makes room for both the pain of separation and for the joy of communion.

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