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beyond ghostly abstractions and unintelligible concretions

An intellectual grasp is frequently called an abstraction.  And in literature and philosophy we talk of abstraction as a kind of diluted colorless version of the concrete... as a concept in the mind rather than something really present to the senses.

But to think of tasting food, for example, is to think of something in a way more attractive than this or that food that lies before one's eyes.  In a sense "to taste food" is infinitely more alluring than "this food": for the former gives rise to a kind of creativity that is unlimited: new foods, new ways of preparing old foods, obsession with food, food food food.  Why?  Is a neurological account of an obsession with food able to give an adequate explanation?  No.  An intentional analysis is needed.  And it reveals that there is a kind of unlimited nature to human  activities directed to the enjoyment of food because the object of desire is BEING, and there is something unlimited to being.

Maybe this explains how we relate to sex and family as well.  We desire an infinite version of ... communion.

Maybe, when Dawkins thinks he has explained away religious fervor in terms of misdirected sexual emotions (romance, faithfulness, belonging, committment, St. Theresa in ecstasy, etc.), he is missing the point.  When he compares it to a moth heading toward a candle flame, he fails to consider that the object of human desire is more like a moth trying to fly toward the sun (which, for all practical purposes, is infinitely far away).

Note also that RD is oblivious to FAMILY emotions (mom/dad/kid stuff), but reduces affective aspect of religion to sex..... does this guy have any kids?
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