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A possibly helpful definition of Truth/Knowledge

I think it worthwhile to point out that reason, as directed toward reality in all of its factors, in seeking to know reality in a more and more encompassing manner, naturally seeks to know truths that could be recognized as such by any other rational being.  So far, nothing new here.  But what would be interesting would be add that any rational creature no matter how evolved, created, constructed (i.e., granting the possibility of strong artificial intelligence for the sake of argument) or otherwise existing may reasonably think these truths false.

By construing truths in terms of how any rational agent should be able to recognize it, one highlights just how amazing they are.  They are not constructs, even though we must construct a path to them.  They are not merely part of a coherent system of thoughts or objects of thought -- even though the aspects of reality that they deliver do cohere with each other.  They are not private mental object but ways in which the world in which we live an act presents itself to us.

Note: multiplicity of possible instances of rationality (as openness to reality in all of its factors) evidences that reason is something more than any one instance thereof.

Another thought: human dignity.  Or to put it more abstractly, the objectivity of the beauty of the rational agent.  Think of this, to say that there's something good about yourself that others, insofar as they are reasonable (i.e., open to reality) should recognize is to claim that any rational being no matter how eveolved, created, constructed or otherwise continuing to be.... must appreciate etc.

I haven't worked this out all that adequately, but I think it's promising.
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Leo White said…
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11:13 AM
Leo White said…
I'm reposting (but not riposte-ing) the comment with typo removed:
Reflecting on this much later on, it seems to me that the point is that anyone trying either to define truth or to give something like a definition must recognize the social dimension of truth and that there is something unbounded both in one's openness to society and possibly to the society to which one is open.
11:19 AM
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