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rhetorical move by Sam Harris

When Sam Harris debated Bill Craig, he ignored BC's arguments and talked on and on about the Old Testament.

A theist could do something similar in a debate... just point to the racist things that Charles Darwin said in the Descent of Man and ask on what basis one would disavow CD.
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Tim D said…
I have to sympathize with Sam Harris here. The OT difficulties (Jephthah, God's ordering the killing of enemy infants, etc) really do appear to be inconsistencies with Christian claims, and aren't easy to explain. Whereas, even if Charles Darwin were shown to be a racist, or even if evolution were shown to have racist consequences (obviously it doesn't), there wouldn't be any inconsistency with the truth of the theory.
2:16 AM
Leo White said…
It would be a genuine red herring to counter points re Old Testament with stuff on Darwin's racism. But apart from the OT stuff, it's simply very worthwhile to point out that atheists need to explain why they embrace a more "mainstream" understanding of human nature rather than Darwin's. The moment that one asks an atheist to give a positive account of why they live as they do--at that moment the atheist becomes a kind of ally in the sense that he/she (unwittingly) starts providing reasons for believing in God.

As for the Old Testament, that is the one thing that I don't have a reply other than a very abstract-sounding one taken from philosophy. What is needed is an approach to the OT narrative that shows continuity and consistency with the NT. I am not the one to provide such an approach--at least not yet.
8:29 PM
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