It's value lies -- not in showing that it is prudent to believe in God -- but that a prudent person must take the question of God's existence seriously.
Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson. He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal. My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this. I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true. Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist. In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...
Comments
Maybe an alternative version of what you propose would be to say that before one considers whether God exists, one must recognize that the very act of seeking to know the answer is an act that is demanded by the very structure of human desire, and especially by that form of desire called wonder.
Instead of saying "even if God doesn't exists" it says "before we attempt to answer the question of whether..."