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those intoxicated by reductionism walk in circles without realizing it

Given: that evolution occurs through chance.

The conclusion that evolution is not teleological makes perfect sense if one is a thoroughgoing reductionist, for in that case, evolution is nothing more than complexification.  So assuming the latter, then yes, evolution offers zero evidence of teleology.  

But to argue on the basis of the apparently ateleological nature of evolution that reductionism is true is to put the cart before the horse.  And that is precisely what folks do: they ignore the question of whether their understanding of life forms, especially what we call higher life forms, ARE more than just more complex versions of non-living things.

The other alternative is that living forms have a kind of UNITY in their complexity and that higher life forms have a higher kind of unity, etc.  If all this is true, then the chanciness of evolution is like the chanciness of an IED: when it goes off is a matter of chance, while that it is there to go off is not.  

That physis seeks and eventually finds its way to bios is teleological, even with all of the wandering (a wandering that can, ala Steven Jay Gould, be compared to a drunk man walking...home: he eventually finds and opens the right door...). 

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