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truth and transcendental community

Think of a truth -- x --about something going on here and now.

When I say to others that I know x, I not only expect that they will agree because they see what I see, I also expect others to whom I have not yet spoken to see and agree to the truth of what I've said, should my proposal come to their attention.  In fact, I expect that all other rational beings, inasmuch as they have an adequate grasp of reality, will see the matter as I do, should they be confronted with the evidence that I've seen.  Of course, every human being's grasp is inadequate to grasp all truths, and my own grasp of things is always somewhat inadequate and hence in need of some correction.  But inasmuch as I am correct, those with an adequate grasp of the matter in question will see things as I do and agree that x is true.

Openness to the possibility of any other ADEQUATELY acquainted rational being's seeing the truth of x is a necessary condition for my claiming that x is true.  By "open" I mean that prior to asserting x, I need not be expressly convinced that that all who have an adequate grasp of the matter in question will agree regarding it:   I can simply neglect to consider such a big-picture question while going on to assert in a very here-and-now-focused manner to the person in front of me that  x is true.   And -- prior to my asserting x -- I don't even need to be convinced that anyone else ever WILL have a sufficiently adequate understanding of reality so as to be able to see what I already see.  But I would not deny that someone who has adequate grasped my words would agree--or at least I would not have the typical motivation for speaking (i.e., to communicate).  And I must not deny that such a person would, thanks to their seeing what I see, would agree with me (if they are honest) regarding the truth of x.  Not denying the possibility of those who have an adequate grasp correctly agreeing regarding x is a necessary condition for thinking that my statement x is true.

To believe and claim that one knows the truth is to associated oneself with a community of rational beings.  A vast community.  One that goes beyond experiences I've had.  Beyond humanly possible experience.

When I claim to know the truth and that a stranger never encountered by me also knows some other truth, y, whose truth I do not yet know, then I am supposing or leaving open the possibility that it could come about that someone who understands both x (which I have asserted) and who understands y (which the other has asserted) and has an adequate grasp of reality.  Such a person would naturally (if both x and y are true) see the truth of both claims and agree that they are both true.  I need not know HOW x can be reconciled with y, but I know that such reconciliation is possible if both x and y are true.  To use the language of phenomenology, I emptily intend the knowing and reconciling of both truths by one who is mindful of both my conviction x and the other's conviction y as well as the bases for our respective convictions.

Truth is inherently coherent and that coherency has an inherently social dimension and that society is open-ended, and that openness is an openness to greater minds capable of understanding how these truths cohere.  And to be open to greater minds capable of recognizing the coherency of truths is to be open to the possibility of a mind that actually recognizes how all genuine truths cohere.  Such a mind should be called Wisdom itself, for it is the actual possession of all truths.  That achievement is a unique one, but that's the topic of another discussion...

To adhere faithfully to the truth, starting with a rather mundane fact, x, is to set on a path that leads to this Wisdom.  To seek the truth is to seek God.

***

Below is an earlier attempt at spelling out this idea:

If I know x, then I am part of a community of knowers who can know x, if and when their attention might be drawn to it.

And x is something that each member, inasmuch as they know reality adequately (in all of its factors) can see how x coheres with other truths.

For  if x is true, then it is part of a whole set of truths.

And these truths are not atomic facts: they cohere with each other.

So that there is a kind of potential community of knowers inasmuch as their truths cohere.

Truth is one... in more ways than one.

To affirm x as true, is to be open to that community as a possibility that might be more and more realized.  To seek to show to others that x is true is to seek to realize that potential more than it was realized before.  To act humanly is, among other things, to communicate truths, to seek communion in truth.  Because of the natural trajectory of this seeking, to communicate is to seek communion in our truth, where our truth is an adequate grasp and a kind of concrete universal: the cohering of all truths that could be had by rational beings.  It is a possibility, even if it is, as far as we have seen, never fully actual.

Man is a being toward truth, toward communion, toward unity in truth.  In our truth, where "our" includes all rational beings.

God is the One in whom these truths actually dwell, or rather, in which our truth already dwells.  God actually knows, for God is The Truth.  To seek the truth is, in a way, to seek God.  To seek to communicate the truth is to seek communion with God.

To deny the truth (or rather that our having truth is desirable, attainable) is to live ironically.  It is to go against oneself and against God.


Next week: the good!  Er, The Good.

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