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running with Einsteinian non-simultaneity like Forest Gump out of the football stadium

Isn't it possible to interpret space-time as not allowing for any simultaneity whatsoever?  That is, if we kept pushing the same line of reasoning that would support the claim that we and the folks in some galaxy "far, far away" cannot rightly be said to exist at the same time, then couldn't one maintain that no two things, no matter how close, exist at the same time?

If so, how might that relate to the concept of "now" that would seem to be a necessary condition of humans sharing something in common with each other (including those we find in scientific practices)?  How would it relate to the internal unity of things (think of DaVinci's drawing of a man with his arms extended: do the right and left are coexist??

Couldn't this give rise to a kind of temporal monadism (on in which there are no wholes because every point in space-time has its own "now")?

Wouldn't the common sense notions that make human endeavors like science possible include that of "now" as something thick, as in "today" or "this century" rather than "this instant"?  Doesn't the having of this sort of now lie in the background as a necessary condition for our having common endeavors?

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