Could it be that the primum mobile postulated as both finite and rational by Aquinas (following Aristotle) allows us to put agency at the center of cosmological arguments for God? Not so much because it's plain silly to argue for such a being, but rather, because, inasmuch as a being is like this one (i.e., inasmuch as it is, like us, an agent, engaged in productive behavior) evidences something greater?
Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson. He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal. My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this. I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true. Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist. In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...
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