Agreed: that quantum indeterminacy is utterly useless to the libertarian argument...if quantum indeterminacy is resorted to as a cause of human freedom, or as the source of the non-determination of human actions. For example, if my decision to eat yogurt rather than drink kefir tomorrow will be triggered by an unpredictable quantum event, well, then even if that action was unpredictable, it was not free simply in virtue of that unpredictability. In fact, it might be more correct to say that it was determined by what happened at the quantum level, even though the determining event was itself unpredictable.
On the other hand, we might point out how quantum indeterminacy undermines the assumption that determinism is universal. It does that, but undermining the argument in support of the the contradictory position is not the same as finding support for one's own. To find that supporting argument, one might look first at common sense -- so called folk psychology -- for help. To the objection that science can trump common sensical, pre-scientific convictions about free will, the answer might be that science itself is ultimately based upon convictions that are themselves part of common sense --- aka folk psychology. These common sense convictions are more basic than and indispensable to science. And our acceptance of free will is just as well-founded as these basic convictions. In fact, it is arguable that the reasons typically given for rejecting free will, at the end of the day, are also reasons for rejecting the objectivity of human knowledge. Such an argument might consist, for example, of undermining the notion that a Turing machine could be cognizant in any way, shape or form.
Suppose we successfully defended giving a prima facie credence to common sense convictions that entail freedom of the will. Not all common sense convictions are beyond challenge, and some important challenges can be directed against our common sense convictions about freedom. For example, there's the objection that processes not predetermined by nature are an impossibility. Much of what I've posted in this blog addresses that objection, so I won't address it at this moment. Except for the following: common sense itself might be used to argue against free will inasmuch as it might seem that all non-determined actions are random, and free will does not seem random. The only alternative to random might seem to be determined. It goes without saying that positivists think there is no tertium quid. But that is because they make no room for the objectivity and intelligibility of the goodness of things. Once reality is seen in terms of the good, an opening is made for the appearance of reasons for actions as influencing human action. And that is where one finds actions neither mechanistically predetermined nor random.
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Afterthought: one way in which quantum indeterminacy could be useful to libertarian arguments (or rather, to any hylomorophic notion of higher/lower powers) would be if it were natural to the will to syncronize the indeterminacies of many particles to bring about otherwise improbable changes. To clarify what I'm talking about, I ask you to suppose just for the moment (unless you're a believer, as I am -- in which case you'll find it quite natural to keep on supposing) that Jesus, as the Son of God, elects to travel through walls by taking advantage of quantum indeterminacy. By syncing the quantum level operations of many particles, Jesus can travel through a wall without breaking either the wall, His bones, or the laws of nature. He might be able to do this transmural kinesis in other ways, but for His own reasons prefers this way on this occasion. The laws of physics are unbroken by this because it is not, strictly speaking, impossible for a material body to pass through a wall: it is just highly improbable that it should do so. I am not proposing that such a quantum syncronization or "magnetization" is a necessary condition for the performance of all miracles; I am not even proposing that such a syncronization is even miraculous: I am just throwing this example out there to give you an idea of how quantum indeterminacy might be related to free will and to supra-chemical operations (by "suprachemical" I don't mean immaterial, but operations whose lawfulness is not intelligible at the level of physics or chemistry). For just as this sync could be instrumental to this imagined case of transmural kinesis (pretty damn fancy way of saying "go through a wall"), so too a syncing of quantum indeterminacy might be involved in suprachemical operations such as volition.
I don't think that this sort of magnetizing is needed for the libertarian argument. But I do grant that, while it may seem a bit of a stretch, it is not useless to libertarian arguments.
On the other hand, we might point out how quantum indeterminacy undermines the assumption that determinism is universal. It does that, but undermining the argument in support of the the contradictory position is not the same as finding support for one's own. To find that supporting argument, one might look first at common sense -- so called folk psychology -- for help. To the objection that science can trump common sensical, pre-scientific convictions about free will, the answer might be that science itself is ultimately based upon convictions that are themselves part of common sense --- aka folk psychology. These common sense convictions are more basic than and indispensable to science. And our acceptance of free will is just as well-founded as these basic convictions. In fact, it is arguable that the reasons typically given for rejecting free will, at the end of the day, are also reasons for rejecting the objectivity of human knowledge. Such an argument might consist, for example, of undermining the notion that a Turing machine could be cognizant in any way, shape or form.
Suppose we successfully defended giving a prima facie credence to common sense convictions that entail freedom of the will. Not all common sense convictions are beyond challenge, and some important challenges can be directed against our common sense convictions about freedom. For example, there's the objection that processes not predetermined by nature are an impossibility. Much of what I've posted in this blog addresses that objection, so I won't address it at this moment. Except for the following: common sense itself might be used to argue against free will inasmuch as it might seem that all non-determined actions are random, and free will does not seem random. The only alternative to random might seem to be determined. It goes without saying that positivists think there is no tertium quid. But that is because they make no room for the objectivity and intelligibility of the goodness of things. Once reality is seen in terms of the good, an opening is made for the appearance of reasons for actions as influencing human action. And that is where one finds actions neither mechanistically predetermined nor random.
---
Afterthought: one way in which quantum indeterminacy could be useful to libertarian arguments (or rather, to any hylomorophic notion of higher/lower powers) would be if it were natural to the will to syncronize the indeterminacies of many particles to bring about otherwise improbable changes. To clarify what I'm talking about, I ask you to suppose just for the moment (unless you're a believer, as I am -- in which case you'll find it quite natural to keep on supposing) that Jesus, as the Son of God, elects to travel through walls by taking advantage of quantum indeterminacy. By syncing the quantum level operations of many particles, Jesus can travel through a wall without breaking either the wall, His bones, or the laws of nature. He might be able to do this transmural kinesis in other ways, but for His own reasons prefers this way on this occasion. The laws of physics are unbroken by this because it is not, strictly speaking, impossible for a material body to pass through a wall: it is just highly improbable that it should do so. I am not proposing that such a quantum syncronization or "magnetization" is a necessary condition for the performance of all miracles; I am not even proposing that such a syncronization is even miraculous: I am just throwing this example out there to give you an idea of how quantum indeterminacy might be related to free will and to supra-chemical operations (by "suprachemical" I don't mean immaterial, but operations whose lawfulness is not intelligible at the level of physics or chemistry). For just as this sync could be instrumental to this imagined case of transmural kinesis (pretty damn fancy way of saying "go through a wall"), so too a syncing of quantum indeterminacy might be involved in suprachemical operations such as volition.
I don't think that this sort of magnetizing is needed for the libertarian argument. But I do grant that, while it may seem a bit of a stretch, it is not useless to libertarian arguments.
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