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phenomenal / noumenal...... freedom/determinism

Trying to sort out Dennett's compatibilism:

We might, at first glance, distinguish the two ways of regarding our free actions as the phenomenal and noumenal.  That is, it is obvious that I can engage in pursuit or avoidance, and this involves a kind of freedom; but my movements are determined in one of those two ways.  But on second thought, this is quite different from Kant's distinction, so perhaps these two terms are not that apt: for the noumenal is never really experienced, but is instead postulated as a condition for the possibility of experience, whereas science is a special sort of experience.

Another comparison, that is in some ways more apt, is Hume's duality of perspectives.  There's the pre-philosophical acceptance of causality, the existence of the self, of free will, etc. and then there's the skeptical attitude of a philosopher.  The latter recognizes how unreal are the objects of our naive experience, but this recognition paralyzes.  We must exit the skeptical attitude in order to on living and interacting with both our physical environment but also our fellow humans.  And so Hume recommends that we do so, but only after having taught us to accept common sense cum grano salis.

The latter seems more like Dennett's compatibilism.  For Hume's philosophical attitude is born from a kind of positivism.  Hume has something very important in common with Descartes.  Even though they can be described at opposite ends of the spectrum that extends from rationalism to radical empiricism, they both look at the physical world atomistically.  Hume's atomism is phenomenal (not trying to pay him a compliment here: talking about phenomenalism); wheras Descartes' is, I believe Democratean.  But both make no room for form as appearing in the world.  It's imposed subjectively, Hume tells us; whereas it's either quantifiable or immaterial for Descartes.

Dennett's use of Conway's game of life places him squarely in Descartes' camp.  He believes that the Democratean view of nature is sophisticated, and it is hard to imagine Dennett paying a higher complement than that!

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