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Daniel Dennett on qualia

I think the contemporary notion of qualia is helpful insight into the insufficiency of scientism.  But that does not mean that its advocates have conceptualized it very well.  Something to study more. Meanwhile, I note that Daniel Dennett, true blue reductionist that he is, argues that the notion of qualia is incoherent.  The premise in this argument is the list of properties of properties that he kindly offers his reader: ineffable, subjective, intrinsic and private.  By setting his argument this way at the beginning, he may be offering a straw man.  I dunno: I haven't really surveyed what everyone out there thinks qualia are like.  But in any case, later on in the argument on this topic that I listened to in Intuition Pumps, he seems to argue in a very clearly circular manner.  I need to find where he does that and transcribe it here ... maybe later this week.

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