Skip to main content

Plantinga's Naturalism Against Evolution argument praised and criticized (part 1)

It seems to me to be effective against certain materialist rationalizations for naturalism (the sort that are used to buttress reductive materialism), but not necessarily against every version of anti-theism.  It works, at the end of the day, against reductive materialism only inasmuch as the zombie objection likewise works (and I think it does) against the same .

In fact, one could construct a zombie version of Plantinga's argument (sort of a Halloween version). That is because Plantinga's argument hinges upon the question of whether or not the actions of a percipient beings are entirely caused by the neuro-physical states of perceiver.  If those states suffice, then any correlative perceptions are themselves superfluous--we have a case of epiphenomenalism. It follows that the truth or accuracy of those perceptions would likewise be irrelevant if the perceptions themselves are.  But those neuro-physical processes do suffice according to reductive materialism (inspire of the way in which reductionists try to have their cake and eat it too).  In other words, at the end of the day, the zombie objection to Dennett's psychology is a successful one. And Plantinga's argument, inasmuch as it hinges on a similar line of reasoning, is cogent against Dennett's and other reductionist conceptions of human cognition.

But such an objection does not necessarily apply to NON-reductive materialism.  For a non-reductive materialist might argue, for example, that perceptions cause changes in behavior in ways that are partially caused by perception as such.  Perception therefore, is not superfluous in every version of non-reductive materialism.  Non-reductive materialism avoids superfluity by granting that perception itself is a material activity but not one that can common to both to living and non-living/non-cognizant beings.  In such a case, the material processes observed in an percipient organism will be material rather than immaterial and lawful rather than unlawful, but the sort of being from which these processes originate is different from that of a non-living and/or non-percipient being, and the lawfulness that we can attribute to its operations is likewise different than what we find in non-living and/or non-percipient beings.  Perception itself will influence the neural-chemical processes in a manner not reducible to chemistry or physics; hence perception will not be superfluous, and the "truth" (or should I say the "truthiness") of this perception will be relevant to the animal's success in attaining that which it desires, avoiding that to which it is averse.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others.  But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and  may eventually go out of existence.  The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual.  The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being.  In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu