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Democratus, Daniel Dennett, quantum theory, humility, and of course, reductionism

In a moment of humility, Daniel Dennett tells us in Intuition Pumps that he just doesn't get quantum theory, no matter how hard he tries.

Perhaps we shouldn't use candid admissions made at such moments against the speaker.  I hope not, because that's what I'm about to do...

It seems to me that quantum theory is a bit of an embarrassment to the argument for materialism found in another book by the same author.  In Freedom Evolves, Dennett makes an analogy between the way in which one playing Conway's Game of Life  can design life-like items and the way we might come to see ourselves as constructed of atoms.

Dennett assures us in that book that Conway's Democratean approach to nature is "sophisticated." But what if that approach is now dated, thanks to quantum theory?  In proposing this, I am not relying on any of the mystical-sounding statements relating quantum theory to consciousness.  I am proposing that even the most staid, sober, "just the facts, ma'am" version of quantum theory might be devastating to a Democratean view of nature.  So, to rest one of one's arguments for materialism upon such a view is to build build a castle made of sand.

Look out, Denny--here comes the (quantum) wave!

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