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nolition is underrated: Dennett's dismissive remark actually points to our desire for the universal good

In Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett uses Benjamin Libet's experiment as a basis for arguing that  we are not free.  That is because Libet's experiment shows that the brain gets ready to act about a third of a second prior to our becoming consciousness of our choosing to act.  Because a non-mental process precedes and makes highly probable the mental process, the will is neither spontaneous nor free.  So the argument goes.  After having made this point, Dennett adds in passing that the buildup in the readiness in the brain (i.e., the build up of the action potential) is not always followed by the movement of the  hand: sometimes, at the very last fraction of second the test subject decides not to move at the last fraction (and I mean fraction) of a second.

Searle points out that since this build up of action potential in the brain is not always followed by hand movement, one cannot rightly say that the former necessitates the latter.  I would agree and make a comment or two.

Comment:  there is something about nolition that is highly reminiscent of Thomas Aquinas's notion of free will.  For Aquinas, we are able to say no to this or that particular good because of our love for the universal good.  For example, I might decline to listen to this music because I want to hear music that is more enjoyable.  The desire to hear better music is not a desire for this or that music but to hear good music in general.  Perhaps a phenomenology of nolition could uncover the interplay between the desire for the universal and particular good that is at work here.  Certainly, for Aquinas, the ability to say no to this or that good is a necessary condition for the free choice of the will.

It does not even occur to Dennett to ask what is going on phenomenologically when nolition is exercised.  Hence he never even considers whether we say no to this X because of our desire for X as such.  This negligence on his part is a sign that he has not studied what pre-Cartesians had in mind when they spoke of free choice of the will.

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