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The best metaphor for the human soul

Aristotle spoke of the soul as the first activity (activity is an English translation of the Greek word entelecheia--a word made up by Aristotle to signify an activity done for the sake of the doer and which tends to be continuous) of a body suitably organized for life.  There is a metaphor in play here: for an activity is, in our everyday usage, something we do in virtue of our already being alive.  That sort of activity can't be, of course, that which makes us alive.  But I suppose that Aristotle is making an analogy rather than being poetically metaphorical: he sees something in human nature that is difficult to name directly, but which operates like something else for which we already have a name. That is, the soul of a person or other organism is to the body of that person (or other sort of organism) in a manner analogous to how the activity of a person is to their readiness, disposition to act. You still have the problem or paradox that the second term in this analogy--the disposition or readiness to act--presupposes what is to be explained.  I think that problem can be managed, but I want to set aside that problem for now and pursue a different line of questioning regarding this analogy.

What if we specify the activity in that metaphor: what if we look for an activity that best sheds light on what it is that makes us human?  Surely, it should be an activity proper to human beings...

How about the use of words?  For the meaning of words  seem to animate the words themselves (waxing phenomenological or poetic here--not sure which).

And what word or words?

How about asking the question "Why?"  That is, isn't the asking of this word animated, as it were, by a desire that drives a process of inquiry?

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