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problematizing the relation between higher and lower level neurons as understood by Dennett

Dennett talks of higher level neurons performing a more complex operation than the lower ones while taking the operations of lower level operations as a kind of basis for their higher operations.

Question: If the processes occurring in the higher and lower neurons are chemically the same except for their placements, then wouldn't the purportedly higher-level neuron simply do the same sort of thing as the lower?  Why would it "know" more than the neurons earlier in the feeding chain of information described (albeit not as such) by Dennett?  In simply pointing to different parts of the brain and saying this part does that, etc.,  isn't Dennett engaging in the sort of mysticism that he derides elsewhere?

Also, if the higher level operation has the lower as its object, then doesn't that make for a lot of cognitive redundancy?  For example, suppose the lowest level neuronal response to a very, very small and faint light on a surface mapped with gridlines.  The very small light emitted at gridline points a1, a2, and a3 at time 1 causes neuron 1 , neuron 2 and neuron 3 to become active.  They in turn cause higher level neuron A to become active.  Isn't A's operation a repetition of the operations of 1, 2, and 3, so that the light being emitted is sensed twice?  Or does no sensation occur until all of these things affect the visual cortex?

If cognition does occur in the visual cortex but not earlier, then what about an animal's interpretation of what it has  seen?  Based on my ignorance, it seems the the "message" in the visual cortex can travel from that area to the motor cortex or to  higher cortical areas: when these areas receive the so-called message does one cognize the same colors and shapes yet again?  If so, then we would see the same color many times over.

I think these questions show that simply pointing to areas of the brain, identifying chemical processes and saying that cognition goes on here and there does not suffice to tell us what is really going on.

What would DD say in reply?

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