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serving as referree again

Having listened to some very worthwhile arguments against ID in its present incarnation, I am anxious to write down a record of these objections here, lest I forget. But before I do so let me see if I can find my way through a controversial

One opponent said that teaching ID will harm our schoolchildren's ability to do science. If ID is insidiously creationist then that criticism of the teaching of ID would certainly be correct, for creationism is false and teaching falsity harms one's ability to know truth. But if by the label ID one means something that presupposes the evidence of evolution found in the fossil record, etc., that we are all descended from a common ancestor, then ID is not creationism (neither instant nor progressive).

Some day, something like ID may or may not become a serious scientific proposal. But to teach it in grade schools before it has been validated by a significant part of the scientific community would be to put the cart before the horse----unless one means by ID something that is neither a religious adherence to creationism nor a testable scientific theory. The third alternative could only be a philosophical analysis of the data of science. Any version of ID amounting to THAT may be suitable for discussion in forums/fora that are already suitable for the discussions of other not-strictly-scientific questions. But such a discussion should be distinguished from scientific inquiry, theory or doctrine.

That said, such a discussion in such a forum would Hardly discourage genuine scientific learning. On the contrary, it would stimulate scientific learning by showing how science is an important part of a more global vision of reality.

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