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Name calling

I've been listening to a talk by Eugenie _?_?_?__ of the Research Council and was convinced by her that it is kinda stupid of those ID folks to complain about "Darwinism." Well, not exactly for the reasons that she gave (even though hers weren't bad).

Then I read something in Touchstone about Alfred Russell Wallace, who discovered natural selection at the same time as Darwin (their papers were presented at the same meeting). The author mentions approvingly that Alfred Russell Wallace believed in something called "intelligent evolution." I approve too. In fact, I think that this name shows more "intelligent design" than the name intelligent design. For if the heretofore ID folks have anything worthwhile to say (which I think is possible), then they can only be heard by distinguishing themselves from the creationists: they need to put the word "evolution" in their name (this may dry up funding for the Discovery Institute).

Back to Eugenie: even though she is a materialist, she really treats theistic evolutionists with the greatest respect and gives good reasons why one could be both a theist and believe that one could conduct one's science in a manner that regards natural selection (and any other requisite natural mechanism) as sufficient for evolution.

Then I read that Behe refers at least some of his opponents as proponents of "unintelligent design." UD? Well, that the oxymornicity of this designation may be precisely Behe's point.

Finally, I learn that creationism comes in two flavors: young earth, old earth. Oh wait: there's two other ways of dividing creationism: into all-at-once (I forget the exact term) and progressive (as in one-step-at-a-time, not as in creationists who are fans of Ralph Nader [a small crowd indeed]).

All of this discussion of who should be called what leads me to propose a whole (dare-I-say) rainbow of new terms.

Let's call those who not only think natural selection suffices to explain the origin of the species but also think that obviates the need for God.... let's call them Dawkinists. Richard Dawkins would not be uncomfortable with this sort of publicity, and he might even forgive us for leaving off the 's' at the end of his name (after all, conservatives don't mind it when their way of thinking is called "conservatism" even though that leaves off the "v" at the end of "conservative." And if Dawkins declines the comment, we can call them Huxleyites or Huxlers, after Thomas Henry Huxley.

Let's call those who think that questions of natural selection give us no information whatever as to God's existence or operation "evolutionary separatists" or "methodologically naturalistic evolutionists." They see science qua science as asking only naturalistic questions and getting only naturalistic answers. It neither affirms nor denies God's role in nature, although a theologian or philosopher looking at the data of science may use that data to reason within their respective discipline about the nature of divine action. We might further subdivide them into "theistic" "atheistic" and "agnostic" evolutionary separatists.

Let's call those who think that some or all of the different species existing today have common ancestors but the way in which evolution has taken place gives testable evidence of intelligent design... let us call them proponents of "intelligent evolution." They do not reject the very idea of evolution, but some might be more accepting of this explanation than others. Those who are ready in principle to agree with ALL that the previously-mentioned group (the evolutionary separatists) affirm (i.e., that humans and all other species have one common ancestor) might be called proponents of "strong intelligent evolution (where "strong" modifies "evolution")." They believe that some of the claims about how and when evolution occurred can serve as the provocation for formulating for formulating testable hypotheses that an artisan/intelligent designer of some sort is involved.

Note that some proponents of intelligent evolution may be such in part because of religious reasons, while others might hold their position for entirely philosophical reasons. There is nothing inherently religious about this position. Nor theistic. Someone may propose that demi-gods or powerful space aliens are responsible for apparent design.

Those who refuse in principle to agree to some of the interpretations given by other evolutionists should be named on the basis of their disagreement. Those who do so because they believe divine revelation includes a special creation may be called "creationists." Those who believe that revelation is the ONLY reliable source of information about this issue can be called "fideistc creationists." If pushed, fideists will go so far as to say that God could have planted misleading data in order to test their (loco en la cabeca) faith. Those who believe that science will never contradict revelation but rather will corroborate creationism are not fideists: they may be called "theologians who are willing to use science to confirm the revelation of creation." Someone who cares only for science may call them dogmatists, but it might be pointed out that dogma means belief/teaching, and is not always bad and is not proper to religious folks.

Given this division, then are all proponents of intelligent design also creationists? No (or not necessarily). After all, proponents of a strong version of evolutionary theory combined with hypotheses about the need for an intelligent source would not necessarily be creationists IF they allow that, as far as natural science is concerned, the possibility that this source may be other than divine cannot be ruled out. And as far as natural science is concerned the question of whether this source is a divine being cannot be definitively answered in the affirmative (inasmuch as any scientific answer is definitive).

Those who because of religious convictions about progressive creation restrict the range of the degree to which evolution has taken place can be regarded as religious persons who also happen to be doing genuine science IF they are ready in principle to allow scientific arguments to correct their narrative of nature that is part of their religious doctrine. But IF they are ready to deny any scientific conclusions that contradict their interpretation of revelation, then they are really fideistic theologians who will use science only when it bolsters their interpretation of revelation.

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