The person who decides to become a scientist does so on the basis of belief and desire, not on the basis of a demonstration (knowledge rather than belief, and knowledge derived from other knowledge). This decision can be a reasonable decision... albeit a leap in the dark (note, by the way, that I said "dark," not pitch-black). This sort of reasonableness makes possible the sort of reasoning engaged in by scientists. And perhaps, at the end of the day, when it comes to applying the fruits of scientific discovery, a similar leap in the dark is called for. In such a case, concrete beliefs about how to satisfy my most important desires are the beginning and end (in the sense of "purpose") of scientific inquiry.
Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson. He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal. My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this. I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true. Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist. In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...
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