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To atheists who are confused about God and morality

The objection to religion is that it's unnecessary: that is, I don't need to believe in God to be morally good.  Evidence is given in the form of pointing to many decent/nice/exemplary/moral persons who are not believers (while ignoring their positions on Eugenics, abortion, infanticide, bestiality [between consenting mammals], etc.)

Instead, offer to clear their heads by asking a few questions.  I imagine the clarification would take place thus:

"Why do you believe that morality comes from God: isn't it obvious to you that an atheist can be moral and a theist can be quite wicked?"

"Do you believe that morality comes from evolution?"

"Yes."

"Do you need to acknowledge the role of evolution in order to be morally good?"

"No."

"So morality can in one sense rely upon something that doesn't even occur to the mind of the virtuous person."

"Yes, but I am not claiming that evolution somehow whispers in our ears what we're supposed to do or commands/threatens us in a personal way.  It's a biological process."

"What if --at some level -- God is  the source of morality in a causal way: couldn't God be the source of morality in this way without your having to recognize or acknowledge it?"

"But why is that important?"

"Well that would explain something very important about morality."

"What is that?  Is it the fact that we think of moral norms as absolute?  I can explain that without talking about God."

"I am confident that you think you can do so, but regardless of whether you are right or wrong, I have something else in mind."

"And what is that?"

"Our longing for the infinite."

"Say what?"

[to be continued]

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