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Why should God care about us?

Dawkins asks why God should care about us measly humans?

The proper reply is that RD is thinking of God as a super-Zeus: that is, a finite but superior personal being.  The greater the disproportion between our being and that of such a being, the less significant we would seem.  But if God is infinitely greater than us, then a different sort of calculus kicks in.  Our being greater or lessor doesn't alter the ratio between us and God.  And God does not have to give less regard.

Consider how, if there are twice as many of us, then a super-Zeus would be able to give half as much attention to each.  But the infinite God is able to give full attention to each, no matter how many that there may be.

Consider how, if a super-Zeus were to become twice as great, we would seem half as significant in comparison.  But an infinite being could regard us precisely according to how we are, not just in proportion to some other finite being.
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