Isn't there a kind of simplicity in every reported case of complexity?
Think of how we might look at various facts at different times and places under a unifying persepctive. The unity/simplicity is in a sense supplied by us, even if there is a genuine sameness in re.
Think of how we look at a collection of machine parts as a functional whole: in this case too, we supply the unity or perhaps project it INTO the machine. But we can’t do the same to organisms
But an organism, and especially a human organism, seems to be a different case. When looking at our own agency "in the first person" (i.e., I, me, mine and perhaps we, us, ours).
At this moment, I can't quite put my finger on the difference, except to point out two things.
1. that regarding machines as wholes is in a sense to mistakenly perceive them as being other selves... not in the sense of thinking they have full blown human agency, but in the sense that they have a kind of diminished version thereof.
2. to deny that the body is genuinely one in a way fundamentally different from a collection of machine parts... to think thus is to imply dualism of one sort or another: either the Cartesian sort or in the sense of inner mental construct vs reality.
Think of how we might look at various facts at different times and places under a unifying persepctive. The unity/simplicity is in a sense supplied by us, even if there is a genuine sameness in re.
Think of how we look at a collection of machine parts as a functional whole: in this case too, we supply the unity or perhaps project it INTO the machine. But we can’t do the same to organisms
But an organism, and especially a human organism, seems to be a different case. When looking at our own agency "in the first person" (i.e., I, me, mine and perhaps we, us, ours).
At this moment, I can't quite put my finger on the difference, except to point out two things.
1. that regarding machines as wholes is in a sense to mistakenly perceive them as being other selves... not in the sense of thinking they have full blown human agency, but in the sense that they have a kind of diminished version thereof.
2. to deny that the body is genuinely one in a way fundamentally different from a collection of machine parts... to think thus is to imply dualism of one sort or another: either the Cartesian sort or in the sense of inner mental construct vs reality.
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