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Introduction to Ockham's Beard

Toward the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, some authors began talking about a conflict between science and religion.  Science, they proposed, offers explanations that can be proven true through measurement and observation--or at least can be proven false.  Religion, on the other hand, offers no method for testing the truth or falsity of its claims, but instead begins and ends with wishful thinking, as in the wish to live forever, to be loved unconditionally, or the wish to return to infantile bliss.  If these critics do not associate religion with childish wishful thinking, then they associate it with fear.  That is, the fear of a judge from whom you cannot escape and a punishment that never ceases.  Religion is anchored in these irrational hopes and fears, say these critics, while science is anchored in  tests through which we

I am sure that there are some religious people whose lives and words might make these criticisms seem particularly apt.  But I also see that there is much that is beautiful in religious experience to which the modern critic is blind.  The aim of this book is to show both this beauty, to explore whether it offers any evidence of God's presence in our world, and to give an account of the blindness that besets modern atheists. This blindness, I will argue, is owing to a misunderstanding of of the scientific method.  This book will therefore clarify the scientific method in such a way that casts light upon its connection to religious experience.  I will show that scientific inquiry is made possible by something within humanity that impels us to seek the divine.  To deny the religious aspect of our humanity, therefore, is actually to undermine the scientific method.

(need to discuss the title of the book and define scientific method)

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