In Cosmos, Thomas Nagel relates how Sharon Street argues for the incompatibility of Darwinism with moral realism. Street argues from there that we must reject moral realism because Darwinism is true. Nagel accepts Street's argument about incompatibility, but he instead rejects Darwinism because moral realism is true.
By Darwinism he means not only the claims that random variation and natural selection occurred, but the additional claim that these suffice to explain how the present-day life forms -- especially the human -- originated from more basic ones. Because they see these two principles as sufficing, Darwinians see their account as dispensing with any need for teleology. In fact, this rejection of teleology extends beyond evolution to the very origin of life. Darwinism, as understood by the likes of Sharon Street and many others, operates in an atelic universe.
Nagel grants that random variation and natural selection occurred and that the earliest life forms arose from the nonliving without any miraculous intervention. But in his opinion the imputation of a mechanistic understanding of nature, i.e., one without teleology, is unwarranted. An atelic account of nature fails both to describe how life forms operate today and how they could have originated from the sub-organic. An adequate account of the origins and present constitution of nature, says Nagel, must recognize the presence of teleology--albeit one that is naturalistic rather than theistic.
I will discuss moral realism in a later post.
By Darwinism he means not only the claims that random variation and natural selection occurred, but the additional claim that these suffice to explain how the present-day life forms -- especially the human -- originated from more basic ones. Because they see these two principles as sufficing, Darwinians see their account as dispensing with any need for teleology. In fact, this rejection of teleology extends beyond evolution to the very origin of life. Darwinism, as understood by the likes of Sharon Street and many others, operates in an atelic universe.
Nagel grants that random variation and natural selection occurred and that the earliest life forms arose from the nonliving without any miraculous intervention. But in his opinion the imputation of a mechanistic understanding of nature, i.e., one without teleology, is unwarranted. An atelic account of nature fails both to describe how life forms operate today and how they could have originated from the sub-organic. An adequate account of the origins and present constitution of nature, says Nagel, must recognize the presence of teleology--albeit one that is naturalistic rather than theistic.
I will discuss moral realism in a later post.
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