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Maxwell's demon

This thought experiment, conjured up by Maxwell, starts with two boxes that are roughly at equilibrium with the normal levels of fluctuation.  Maxwell asks us to imagine a demon that is able to open and shut teeny-tiny doors between the two boxes.  These doors open and shut very quickly without creating any significant entropy in either box.  Their timing is precisely controlled by the demon so that high speed particles enter one door going in the direction of box A and low speed ones travel only in the other direction.

As Sean B. Conner points out, this is a good metaphor for life, for it constantly creates a low disequilibrium, which it uses to perform life functions.

I would like to point out that the metaphor of the demon, inamusch as it is a rational, illustrates how life seems to come from mind.

In order to keep track of the movement of particles, the demon relies upon notes which need to be erased in order to make room for new information.  This erasure itself creates entropy so that the net amount of entropy generated by demon+boxes is greater than zero.  Entropy is not so much being simply diminished as it is being diminished in particular place (the two boxes) while the process of guiding the doors is such that entropy is being increased elsewhere.

I have no comment about that except to add that we suppose that there are extra dimensions in which the demon operates, so that, as far as we can note while looking at the everyday dimensions, entropy is being slowed down.  The soul or mind would be analogous to that extra dimension, methinks.

Comments

Anonymous said…
Isn't it Maxwell's Demon?
7:02 PM
Leo White said…
Yup:corrected as noted.
Thanks!
8:25 AM
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