Isn't Aristotle's notion of spheres and the intelligent beings that direct them as prime movers or unmoved movers (but not THE unmoved Mover)... isn't this a way of tipping his hat to something like polytheistic accounts of natural phenomena (the gods cause this and that natural phenomenon) but a non-materialistic version therof)? (but then again, Greeks don't wear hats...) AND isn't the positing of one transcendent, utterly unmoved Mover an affirmation of the existence of a supreme Being that is like the Platonic Good as the supreme Being? Three asides: First the Good is not just another god--it is not just another being among the other "divine: beings, but is a kind of condition for the possibility of the being of the many divine beings). Secondly, Aristotle's sort of Supreme Being is personal inasmuch as it is intelligent, but it is not exactly a personal being inamsuch as it is not personally involved in the day-to-day events going on in each ...
Commentary and discussion regarding science, faith and culture by Leo White