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Criticizing Conway's Game of Physics--again

The transitions occurring at the pixel level are described by laws.  The pixels themselves, however, should not be understood (Dennett tells us), as using power to act on each other.  They merely follow laws of transition.  But in that case, since the laws are not themselves pixels, then nature would consists of two realities: pixels and laws that guide pixels.  But in that case, if the pixels represent matter, then the laws would be immaterial--more supernatural than natural.  We can avoid this dualism by saying that the laws merely describe how the pixels transition rather than forcing them transition in the ways that they do.  In this conception of things, we merely abstract laws from the transitions we might observe going on in the pixels rather than conceive of the laws as imposing themselves upon the pixels from without.

In that case, however, there is no reason why they act in the ways that they do.  And there is a fortiori, no reason for them to act consistently at all.  Ever.

I am not pointing out an epistemological problem like Hume's problem of induction (which, for all I know, may not be a problem tomorrow).  Rather, I am pointing to a metaphysical problem that besets the neo-Democratean Game of Physics (as I like to call Conrad's game of life when played at the pre life-like level).  If there is in nature nothing but pixels transitioning, then there is nothing in nature making them transition rather than not transition at all; there is nothing in nature that makes them transition in one way rather than another way.  Nothing.  Nada.  Nichts.

That's not the same thing as saying that there are or may be occult powers about which we may only surmise--powers influencing things in one way now but which may be replaced by other powers influencing pixel transitions in another way tomorrow.  Rather, it's like saying there are no powers in nature, nor have there ever been, nor will there ever be (of course, saying such a thing and understanding it both seem to be exercises of power, but let's set that performative contradiction aside for the moment).  

Whence all this talk of power, then?  I suppose the answer is a Humean one:  power is subjective.  At its most basic level and at every level thereafter.  It would seem, therefore, that a person who starts off talking about nature in these sort of neo-Democratean terms and later on entertains convictions about determinism being objectively true has either failed to realize that he is locked in the carriage of Humean subjectivity, has fallen out without realizing it, or has snuck out, hoping others won't notice.

Dennett's pixel-talk is a marvelous example of incoherence; Conway's Game of Life is a shell game in which powers appear--magically.

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